在本篇代写价格-英国铁路网因故障导致的安全问题的研究中，对网络轨道和波特酒吧进行了分析。英国铁路监管办公室(ORR)最终提出，2011年，英国铁路网需要为故障支付3000万英镑。许多问题导致了系统的故障。从内部来看，组织特征导致了风险因素的不可避免的出现。这些例子表明，环境限制是可以预防的，而风险和授权问题是可以解决的。必须回顾和确定这些问题，以便在今后防止这种死亡。通过对过去事件的分析，可以开发出更好的服务和协议。这将导致更好的性能和安全标准。
The Network rail was fined 3 million pounds for failure to provide safety over the Potters Bar train. This had killed over 7 people. It was concluded that the rail infrastructure had caused a breach in the safety regulations over the accident in May 2002. This crash could have been avoided if the faulty points were addressed. The overall responsibility for the track was addressed by the Network rail predecessor. The Railtrack was an administration that had caused the crash to occur and its role was addressed in the country rail infrastructure. This event could have been prevented if there were certain managerial and management changes enforced (Wilson and Norris, 2005). Many scandals and unfortunate accidents could be prevented in the companies if they are able to bring in management changes. Each case needs to be scrutinized by the people if the aim is to ensure safety and security of all the stakeholders involved in the process.
As an inception step for this analysis, the reasons were found and detailed in the following section.
The main root case of the incident was the faulty maintenance points. It can be alluded that the initial deduction of the issues could have prevented the fatality. Jarvis was the railway maintenance contractor who along with the infrastructure controller Network Rail was working for the project. He had reported that there were no faults. The HSE had found evidence in 2003 that they had reported that no issues were present as of May 9th 2002. During this time, West Anglia Great Northern (WAGN) had stated that there could be issues and had reported the same regarding the safety. This was in direct contradiction to the report that was submitted earlier. These conflicting reports had created a situation for the people who were involved to be confounded. An obvious miscommunication and lack of cohesive communication have caused the systems to face a number of issues (Jupe, 2009). To elucidate further, it is evident that significant information mismatch is observed. An innate lack in communication is observed between the inspector and the site engineer (Hope, 2002). It is deduced from this factors that the main principle issue was the absence of understanding between the safety limitations and lack of common maintenance. These are found to be present between the different infrastructure companies. These follow to figure out the features of the organization that causes the occurrence of the risk. This is a paradigm example of the issues that a company faces owing to the lack in proper internal governance. This has been detailed in the following section.
